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deposit was expressly held to be a pledge.4 In another, the lessee
was allowed damages for conversion of the sum by the lessor.5
Accordingly, it is the usual view that these deposits are subject to
set-offs and counterclaims only in connection with the express .pur-
poses for which the deposits were made.6 For instance, in a New
York case,7 a deposit was made to secure payment of rent and taxes.
Lessee, evicted for non-payment of rent, was held entitled to the
deposit minus only the rent due and not the depreciation in rental
value or costs of the dispossess action. The reasoning advanced in
these cases is that the deposit is still the property of the lessee and
the lessor has merely a right to hold it until the conditions for which
it was given are fulfilled or made impossible of fulfillment. In every
case, the deposit receipt or the deposit clause in the lease or contract
determined the extent of these conditions.
In view of these decisions, it seems that the holding of the prin-
cipal case was erroneous. B's interest in the $3,000 consisted of a
right to retain it if A did not go into possession. But A went into
possession, thereby cutting off this claim. To allow B to set-off an
unsecured claim for extra construction costs is not only to go outside
of the express conditions limiting B's interest in the deposit, but to
allow an unjustified preference to a creditor of a bankrupt as well.
PETER HAIRSTON, JR.
Real Property-Registration-Mortgage of Wife Without
Privy Examination.
A man and his wife borrowed money to purchase realty, giving a
note secured by a deed of trust on the property purchased. No
acknowledgment or privy examination of the wife was actually had,
though the notary's certificate stated the contrary and the registra-
tion was apparently regular. Subsequently a valid deed of trust was
executed and recorded. In an action by the wife to restrain a fore-
' Kaufman v. Williams, 92 N. J. L. 182, 104 AtI. 202 (1918).5Atlas v. Moritz, 217 App. Div. 38, 216 N. Y. S. 490 (1926). But note that
in Goodman v. Scharched, 144 Misc. Rep. 905, 260 N. Y. S. 883 (1932), the
holding was limited to cases where the deposit was expressly given as security.
I Set-off allowed: Burke v. Norton, 42 Cal. App. 705, 184 Pac. 45 (1919) ;
Lieberman v. Lavene, 253 Mass. 579, 149 N. E. 625 (1925); Sockloff v. Burn-
stein, 177 App. Div. 471, 164 N. Y. S. 262 (1917). Set-off denied: Rez v.
Summers, 34 Cal. App. 527, 168"Pac. 156 (1917) ; Shanklin v. Kamin, 197 Ill.
App. 630 (1916) ; see Knight v. Marks, 183 Cal. 354, 191 Pac. 531, 532 (1920).
Crausman v. Graham Const. Co., 95 Misc. Rep. 608, 159 N. Y. S. 709
(1916).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
closure and sale under the first deed of trust it was held, that though
the first deed of trust was admittedly invalid and equity would not
enforce a specific performance, the amount so loaned would consti-
tute an equitable lien on the land. The Supreme Court in affirming
the dissolution of the injunction and decision of the lower court al-
lowed priority to the first deed of trust.1
As between the alleged grantor and grantee the attempted con-
veyance by a married woman of her realty is a nullity in absence of
her privy examination.2 Though specific performance quite gen-
erally has been denied, the property in some cases has been charged
with an equitable lien where the married woman 'has received the
benefits of the transaction.m3 In all such cases in North Carolina no
subsequent incumbrancer was involved.4 Other cases have held the
married woman liable in damages for breach of her contract to
convey.5
Conceding the justice of the principal case as between the parties,
what effect should the equitable lien have upon the priority of a sub-
sequent incumbrancer: (1) where the first deed is unregistered, and
(2) where registered?
(1) If the first deed of trust is unregistered it will be ineffective
'Boyett v. First National Bank of Durham, 204 N. C. 639, 169 S. E. 231
(1933). Under the decision of the lower court, affirmed, the payees of the
notes secured by the first deed of trust were held entitled to a sale of such
land to satisfy the balance due, the proceeds of such sale to be applied as fol-
lows: (1) To the costs of the sale, (2) the payees of the notes secured by the
first deed of trust, (3) to clerk of court to hold for subsequent incumbrancers
or claimants.
'Smith v. Ingram, 130 N. C. 100, 40 S. E. 984 (1902) ; Warren v. Dail, 170.
N. C. 406, 87 S. E. 126 (1915) ; Hardy v. Abdallah, 192 N. C. 45, 133 S. E.
195 (1926) ; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §997; TIFFANy, REAL PROPERTY
(1912) §477.
'Burns v. McGregor, 90 N. C. 222 (1884) ; North v. Bunn, 122 N. C. 766,
29 S. E. 776 (1898) ; Gann v. Spencer, 167 N. C. 429, 83 S. E. 620 (1914) (as
to betterments) ; TiFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (1912) §564.
" In Burns v. McGregor, supra note 3, a married woman contracted to con-
vey a smaller for a larger tract of land and to give a mortgage back to secure
the difference in price. After execution of the deed she refused to acknowledge
the mortgage back as of her own free will. Held, the land conveyed to her is
subject to the price by reason of an equitable lien-if she keeps the property
she must pay the debt. (But no subsequent incumbrancer was involved.)
'Warren v. Dail, supra note 2 (though a married woman cannot convey
realty without a privy examination she may be held for damages for breach of
a contract to convey land, but equity will not decree specific performance);
Foster v. Williams, 182 N. C. 632, 109 S. E. 834 (1921) (no lien was allowed
where the deed of trust was invalid for want of privy examination of the
wife).
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as notice as against a subsequent creditor or purchaser for value
holding under a registered instrument. 6 No notice, however full or
formal, will supply the want of registration.7
In (2), where the first deed is registered, two problems arise:
what effect has it as notice (a) where such deed is defective on its
face as to acknowledgment or proof of probate, and (b) where such
defect is latent?
As to (a), North Carolina has consistently held that a deed,
though registered, when defective on its face, is no notice to sub-
sequent incumbrancers. 8 The result is not so clear where the de-
fective probate is latent, i.e. does not appear upon the face of the
instrument.
North Carolina has held that where the defect in the registered
instrument is due to the disqualification of the probating officer, and
such defect is latent, one taking under the grantee in such instrument
gets a good title unless the one claiming the benefit of the defective
registration is "cognizant of the facts."9 But in such a situation the
conveyance itself was valid as between the parties without registra-
tion.' 0 In the principal case the probate of the first deed of trust
was latently defective in that there was a complete absence of the
wife's privy examination. The registration should not be effective
as notice to the subsequent incumbrancer, for, as between the parties,
such a deed is a nullity." The wife could set up the absence of the
privy examination to avoid the deed apparently regular on the pro-
bate,12 Consolidated Statutes Section 1001 not applying to such a
ON. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §3309 provides that no conveyance of
realty will be valid as against creditors or. bona fide purchasers unless .regis-
tered.
7Collins v. Davis, 132 N. C. 106, 43 S. E. 579 (1903) ; Buchanan v. Clark,
164 N. C. 56, 71, 80 S. E. 424 (1913) ; Duncan v. Gully, 199 N. C. 552, 155 S. E.
167 (1930) ; TiFFANy, REAL PROPERT (1912) §478 and notes.
8 Wood v. Lewey, 153 N. C. 401, 69 S. E. 268 (1910) ; Fibre Co. v. Cozad,
183 N. C. 600, 112 S. E. 810 (1922) ; Bank v. Tolbert, 192 N. C. 126, 133 S. E.
558 (1926).
'Blanton v. Bostic, 126 N. C. 418, 35 S. E. 1035 (1900) ; Bank v. Tolbert,
supra note 8.
"'Blanton v. Bostic, supra note 9; Warren v. Williford, 62 S. E. 697, 148
N. C. 474 (1908) ; Weston v. Roper Lumber Co., 160 N. C. 263, 266, 75 S. E.
800 (1912).
u Supra note 2.
"Benedict v. Jones, 129 N. C. 470, 40 S. E. 221 (1901) ; Davis v. Davis,
146 N. C. 163, 59 S. E. 654 (1907); Lumber Co. v. Leonard, 145 N. C. 339,
59 S. E. 134 (1907).
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situation. s It has been held that a deed void for want of mental
capacity of the grantor will not be validated by proper registration
even as against subsequent incumbrancers. 14 ' A married woman's
conveyance without her privy examination is equally void, and it is
difficult to see how a void deed acquires any additional validity for
registration and notice purposes because it seems to be regular. To
hold otherwise would be to give the registration acts an unintended
effect by allowing them to abrogate the requirements as to a married
woman's conveyance of her realty.15
The privy examination of the wife being prerequisite to a valid
conveyance of her realty, it is submitted the Court is allowing in-
directly that which is prohibited directly by permitting an apparently
regular registration to validate a void instrument and to charge a
subsequent incumbrancer with notice so as to defeat his priority.
Though it is doubtful that the Court intended to go so far, it has
apparently done so in affirming the decision of the lower court.
HENRY L. ANDERSON.
Sales-Conditional Sales-Registration.
Dealer sold automobiles to customers on conditional sale and
assigned the contracts to finance company, with an unrecorded agree-
ment that repossessed cars should be purchased by dealer from
finance company for the unpaid balance due from customers. Finance
company was to hold title, dealer to be bailee for storage only, with
duty to deliver to finance company on demand. Finance company
claimed several cars so held from the dealer's receiver. Held, for
claimant; the agreement was not a conditional sale and need not be
recorded.'
Either by express statutory provision or by judicial construction
the requisite of recordation has been imposed upon chattel mort-
" N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §1001 providing that an innocent pur-
chaser is not affected by fraud in the treaty if the privy examination is regular,
does not apply to situations where there is a complete absence of privy ex-
amination. See Davis v. Davis, supra note 13.
"'Thompson v. Thomas, 163 N. C. 500, 79 S. E. 896 (1913).
1 The requirements prerequisite to a married womanes valid conveyance of
-her realty are specifically set forth. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §997.
The registration acts (N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §3309) are for the
-protection of subsequent creditors and purchaser for value, and not for the
purpose of correcting defects in the execution of an instrument of conveyance.
Cutter Realty Co. v. Moneyhun Co., Inc., 204 N. C. 651, 169 S. E. 274
<1933).
